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Abstract 
 
This paper extends the debate on making public sector wages more responsive to those in the 
private sector. The way in which the public/private sector wage differential is calculated dramatically 
alters conclusions and far from there being substantial regional disparity in wages offered to public 
sector workers, any differences are predominantly concentrated in London and the South East 
where public sector workers are significantly disadvantaged relative to private sector workers. This 
has implications for staff recruitment and retention. Such findings question the need for regional 
market-facing pay but highlight the necessity to revisit the London-weighting offered to public sector 
workers. 
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Introduction 
The increasing size of government deficits following the 2007/08 financial crisis and policies put in 
place to address it led to the spotlight being placed on the size of the government sector workforce 
and the level of public sector pay. In many countries, this led to policies to reduce the size of the 
public-sector workforce and restraints on public sector pay (see Christofides and Michael, 2013).  
Public support for the latter policy was often encouraged by data that showed wages, uncorrected 
for characteristic differences, being much higher in the public sector (see, for example, Canadian 
Union for Public Employees, 2011; Congressional Budget Office, 2012). 
 
Indeed, the size of the public sector deficit and public sector pay were central issues in the run-up to 
the 2010 UK General Election. In 2009, just over 6 million individuals in the UK were employed in the 
public sector, representing 21% of total employment (Matthews, 2010). The public sector pay bill 
amounted to £182 billion, 30% of all government expenditure and 13.1% of national income (IFS, 
2011). In the June 2010 emergency budget the new government set out plans for reducing the 
deficit which included a two-year public sector pay freeze for public sector workers earning over 
£21,000. It was estimated that the pay freeze would save £3.3 billion a year by 2014/2015, and the 
deficit reduction plan would lead to a loss of 730,000 public sector jobs by 2016/2017. In 2011, the 
Government announced the pay freeze would come to an end and emphasis was placed on making 
public sector pay more responsive to local labour market conditions via Pay Review Bodies.1 For this, 
the Government used evidence from the Institute of Fiscal Studies (IFS, 2012) which revealed a 
national public/private sector pay premium of 8.3%, but with substantial regional variations.  For 
example, the largest public sector pay premium was found in Wales (at 18.0%), followed by 
Yorkshire and Humberside (13.4%) and Scotland (13.4%).  The South East (0.5%) and London (4.6%) 
had the smallest differentials. On the basis of this evidence the Treasury (2012) made the case for 
regional/market-facing pay, suggesting that the public sector pay premium revealed the public 
sector pays more than is necessary to recruit, retain and motivate staff in some areas and this would 
have implications for the quality of service delivery.  It was also suggested that more market-facing 
pay would help private business ‘become more competitive and expand’ by avoiding crowding out, 
particularly in areas where public sector pay is relatively high. 
 
                                                          
1 This was not the first time that the UK Treasury has considered introducing regional/local pay. In the 2003 
Budget the Chancellor of the Exchequer proposed to introduce measures to ensure the public service systems 
are more responsive to regional labour market conditions (HM Treasury, 2003). One area where this did take 
place was in the Ministry of Justice, when in 2007 it introduced five regional pay zones which led to some local 
pay variation outside of London. 
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In light of this debate, we examine the size of the public/private sector pay premium and its 
sensitivity to specification changes. Adding to this body of research in the context of pay localisation 
within a regional setting, we also discuss the policy implications of our findings. We begin by 
reviewing some of the evidence on the size of regional public/private wage differentials across and 
within countries before briefly highlighting the influence that such differentials will have for the 
crowding out of private sector jobs and potential recruitment and workforce quality issues. We then 
derive estimates for the size of the regional public/private sector pay differential for the UK and 
conduct sensitivity analysis to show how the wage differential changes with the inclusion/exclusion 
of certain independent variables. We draw reference to the work of the IFS (2012) as a convenient 
starting point for our own analysis and discussion and we benchmark our results against these given 
the prominence of this work in the recent policy debate. Finally, considering our findings, we draw 
out policy conclusions in the final section. 
 
Background  
Evidence on Pay Premiums 
International comparisons on the size of the public/private sector wage differential across countries 
are problematic given that the composition of public sector workers varies dramatically.  However, a 
common finding in the literature when making comparisons within countries is that the wage 
distribution is more compressed in the public sector then the private, with public sector workers 
enjoying a wage premium at the lower tail of the distribution but a wage penalty at the upper tail. 
There is also a smaller gender pay gap in the public sector and less regional variation in wages (see 
Krueger, 1988; Bender and Heywood, 2010). 
 
Explanations for these phenomena include the greater success of trade unions in the public sector, 
where coverage rates tend to be relatively high, in raising the wages of relatively low paid workers; 
the greater enforcement of legislative measures to reduce exploitation of workers in the public 
sector; political consideration limiting wage increases for relatively high paid workers; and lack of 
performance measures in many public sector jobs. Bender and Heywood (2010) note that in many 
countries comparability is the most often used principle to set wages in the public sector. Gregory 
(1990) also notes the government should act as a ‘model employer’ in terms of employment policies, 
leading to lower earnings discrimination in the public sector. For a review of the evidence of the 
public sector pay gap in a number of Euro area countries see Giordano et al. (2011). 
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While an enormous amount of literature exists examining country-wide sector wage differentials, a 
much smaller literature has looked at regional public/private sector wage differentials within 
countries. A notable exception is Elliott et al. (2007) who examine the subject for five large European 
countries. They find the public/private sector wage differential in France and the UK is nowhere near 
as large as in Spain and Italy.  However, they do find these former countries have a capital problem, 
such that Paris and London have a problem in providing common public services in these high wage 
areas.2  In addition, for France it is found that a recruitment and retention problem exists for highly 
skilled workers in some poorer regions. Italy, France and Spain are also found to have highly 
centralized public sector pay systems and in Italy and Spain there are large regional private sector 
wage variations. As such, the centralized public sector pay systems of Italy are seen as a regional 
policy mechanism to boost consumption in poorer areas as a result of a north/south earnings divide 
in the private sector. 
 
Much of the literature in the US has looked at differences between Federal, State and Local 
Government (Lewin et al., 2012 inter alia) but, as noted by Lewis and Galloway (2011), regional 
investigations are sparse. However, early work by Belman and Heywood (1995) concludes that 
sectoral wage differentials vary significantly across states, a finding also confirmed by Llorens (2008) 
which identifies a large positive differential in California and a large negative differential in 
Mississippi. 
 
Labour Market Implications of Public Sector Pay Premiums 
In the context of the UK, research on the potential for public sector pay policy to crowd out private 
sector employment has been undertaken by Henley and Thomas (2001). Using micro panel data 
from the British Household Panel Survey 1991-1996, they find no evidence for this outcome but 
rather that the Keynesian multiplier effect dominates any displacement effect from public sector 
wages.  They also find that higher unemployment in regions with relatively high public/private sector 
wage differentials was ‘consistent with the suggestion that crowding-out is less likely in such 
regions’.  Subsequent research by Faggio (2015) that evaluates the dispersal of civil service jobs up 
until 2010 from London to the regions following recommendations from the Lyons Review (2004) 
finds an overall positive impact on private sector employment. While the effect on manufacturing 
jobs is negative, the overall effect in the private sector is positive. For every 10 civil service jobs 
dispersed to an area, an additional 5.5 jobs are created in the private sector overall, with the 
majority of these within 2km of the dispersal. 
                                                          
2 Morikawa (2016) notes a similar problem exists in Tokyo. 
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As well as highlighting the potential for crowding out, the Treasury (2012) also cite research noting 
the potential impact on service quality ‘in some areas there may not be sufficient incentives to 
recruit, retain and motivate quality public sector staff’. They quote research by Ma, Battu and Elliot 
(2009) who find public/private sector wage differentials are positively associated with teaching 
vacancies and a link between the pay differential and teaching quality.  They also discuss research by 
Burgess, Gossage and Propper (2003) and Propper and Van Reenan (2010) that outlines implications 
of pay differential for the National Health Service (NHS).  Indeed, when analysing heart attack data 
the latter study finds a ‘10 per cent increase in wages outside of nursing was associated with a 7.4 
per cent increase in mortality’.3  In contrast, Greaves and Sibieta (2014) find little evidence that 
higher teacher salaries increase pupil attainment at age 11 and that location choices of high-quality 
teachers ‘are not sensitive to salary differentials’ and suggest other strategies to improve student 
performance.  However, Crawford and Disney (2015), when analysing the quality of recruits to the 
police force in the UK, finds a higher outside wage is associated with a lower quality applicant and 
that national pay scales cannot respond to variations in the disamenity of an area as measured by 
violent crimes. Such effects manifest themselves in poorer quality police applicants. 
 
Data and Estimation Strategy 
The data are taken from the quarterly versions of the Labour Force Survey (LFS), a large-scale survey 
conducted by the Office for National Statistics. Begun in 1992 as a follow on to the previous annual 
version of the survey, we pool the quarterly surveys over the period 2009q1-2015q4 to examine the 
UK public/private pay differential and to assess regional variation over time. The start date was 
chosen to provide consistency with the commonly cited IFS (2012) study and the end was 
determined by the most recently available quarter of data at the time. With this data, estimates of 
the public/private sector pay differential are obtained based on a linear regression of log-hourly 
earnings against a range of commonly used independent variables adopting the demarcation 
between public and private sectors as given within the LFS. The survey defines the public sector as 
that owned, funded or run by central or local government and respondents are classified as being 
                                                          
3 While these two studies highlight rigidity in the NHS wage system, it should be noted that even though 
national pay scales (which includes London uplift) based on job evaluations are operated, the Market Forces 
Factor (MFF) funding formula is designed to take account of area differences in costs. By far the largest 
difference in costs relate to staff costs and the staff Market Forces Factor (a component of the MFF) has been 
designed to compensate for these potential cost differences.  This formula uses ASHE data to account for local 
area differences in private sector wages.  The NHS pay system for nurses, while a national system, allows 
health care providers to offset potential recruitment and retention issues through paying a recruitment and 
retention premia (RRP) to staff on top of national scales. However, there is evidence that health care providers 
in the NHS are reluctant to make extensive use of this tool (NHS Pay Review Body, 2012). 
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employed in the public or private sector based on information collected about an individual’s 
employer.4, 5 
 
We do not, however, consider the issue of pension provision.  While there is a generally held view 
that not only are wages higher in the public sector but so too are pensions, Danzer and Dolton 
(2012) find this may not be the case. Examining a group of highly educated individuals, they calculate 
measures of Accumulated Lifetime Total Reward (ALTR, which includes pensions, paid holidays, 
benefits in kind and health insurance) for public and private sector employees. They find the ALTR 
for public and private sector males are more or less equal at the age of 59, although a large and 
positive ALTR does exist for females in the public sector at the same age. This issue is further 
complicated by the findings of Cribb and Emmerson (2014) who show that the size of public/private 
sector pay differentials when including pensions (and other benefits) depends on what comparison 
groups are used and what benefits are included.6  
 
Results and Discussion 
Aggregate Results 
Given the importance attached to the IFS estimates of the public/private sector pay differential, we 
have used these findings as a starting point for an examination of public sector wage structure 
across the UK. A sensitivity analysis is then undertaken to examine how these estimates change 
when a number of additional controls which have been found in the literature to be important in 
determining earnings are included. These results are shown in Table 1 and are presented over two 
separate time periods: 2009q2-2011q1 mimics that used by the IFS; 2011q2-2015q4 updates to the 
most recent period post financial crisis. Row 1 compares our results with those of the IFS using a 
                                                          
4 Compared to the employer-based ASHE survey, which would be expected to provide a more accurate 
classification of sector, the LFS tends to overstate the size of the public sector (Heap, 2005). Part of this is due 
to outsourcing, where individuals believe they work in the public sector but are actually employed by the 
private sector.  
5 We investigated this issue of sectoral classification extensively. As an alternative, we reclassified those who 
work in higher education or as temporary agency workers into the private sector as suggested by Heap (2005) 
and performed the entire analysis on this basis. The underlying story presented later is unaffected by this 
adjustment and indeed the magnitude of estimates is little changed. Alternatively, as a matched employer-
employee survey the Workplace Employer Relations Survey (WERS) may give a more accurate representation 
of the public/private sectors. While previous authors such as Bryson et al. (2017) have used WERS data at an 
aggregate level, there is no analysis of regional public sector differentials using this data source. When we used 
WERS data along such regional lines an unclear and puzzling pattern emerged that is not consistent with the 
existing evidence base. For that reason, we use the LFS as our data source, although unravelling the puzzling 
regional results within WERS would be a fruitful avenue for future research. All results are available upon 
request.  
6 It should also be noted that such calculations do not take account of the fact that the decline in pension 
provision and defined benefit schemes will mean that many poorly paid private sector workers (and indeed 
some public sector workers) are likely to be increasingly supported by the state in old age.  
 
 
7 
similar specification and we will initially concentrate upon results estimated over the period 2009q2-
2011q1. For men, there is a statistically significant wage premium of 8.1% (IFS 8.9%) and for women 
the premium is 16.1% (IFS 15.5%).7 The first check undertaken is to redefine the dependent variable 
(hourly earnings) by dividing weekly earnings by usual paid hours as suggested by the ONS (see Laux 
and Marshall, 1994) rather than actual hours as undertaken by the IFS. They propose that this might 
be a more appropriate route to follow as the reference period form actual earnings and actual hours 
do not always coincide and can be further complicated by holiday pay. As shown in row 2, this 
reduces the premium to 6.1% for men and 15.1% for women. Controlling for a richer set of 
educational qualifications (in conjunction with years of education) and regions reduces the 
differentials further to 2.4% and 9.5% respectively.  From this base of row 3 we then sequentially 
add additional controls for job tenure, establishment size, occupations, part-time employment and 
managerial responsibility.8 The most noticeable effect from adding these controls is found through 
the inclusion of establishment size controls (see row 5), reducing the differential to -2.9% for men 
and 6.0% for women.  When the complete set of additional controls that are often included in 
earnings equations in empirical investigations such as this are introduced (see row 9), the differential 
reduces further to -3.9% and 5.6% respectively. However, it is evident that adding the set of controls 
for plant size in isolation has arguably the most pronounced effect upon the wage premium and it is 
this aspect that we will investigate further in sections 4.2 and 4.3. 
 
[insert Table 1 here] 
 
The public/private sector wage differential is known to vary over the business cycle, being higher in 
recessions and falling in periods of recovery. Indeed, Disney and Gosling (1998, 2008) reveal that the 
raw public/private sector wage differential increased sharply in the two recessions in the 1980s and 
1990s and over the period 1975 to 2006 the long run characteristics adjusted differentials ‘do not 
seem to depart strongly from zero’. It is therefore of interest to examine how the public/private 
sector wage differential has evolved more recently. This is shown in the final column of Table 1 and 
for completeness comparable estimates over all specifications are presented for the updated period 
2011q2-2015q4. Concentrating upon the estimates in row 9 (although the pattern exhibited is the 
same across all rows), there is a distinct squeezing of the differential as the economy has recovered 
from recession in the wake of the financial crisis. This latter period would also pick up the effects of 
                                                          
7 More correctly, the figures in the tables are log point estimates and the actual percentage effect is [exp(β) -
1]x100, where β is the log point estimate. However, we will adopt the convention of referring to these as 
percentage effects in all the discussion that follows. 
8 These additional controls are added independently and not cumulatively. 
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the two-year public sector pay freeze introduced in 2011 following the Budget and later public 
sector pay policies limiting wage increases to 1% for many public sector employees. Consistent with 
this, the negative differential for men in favour of the private sector (-3.9%) increases in magnitude 
over the latter period (-4.8%), while the public sector premium for women declines from 5.6% to 
2.4%. 
 
Moving on from the estimates presented in row 9, there are two particular aspects of the empirical 
framework which might impact upon pay premiums. The first relates to the collection of proxy data 
in the LFS, whereby information is not provided by individuals themselves but by someone else in 
their household and around one third of responses are collected by proxy. Relative to the estimates 
in row 9, controlling for this feature in the data has a statistically insignificant effect upon the 
sectoral pay differentials (see row 10).9 Second, it has also been suggested that when undertaking 
public/private sector comparisons, only those occupations that exist in both sectors should be used 
to avoid bias (Moulton, 1990). Row 11 provides estimates of the wage differential where 
occupations at the 4-digit level are matched such that only occupations that exist in both the public 
and private sectors are included in the sample.  This adjustment has a negligible upon the estimated 
effects which are consistently insignificantly different from those of row 9. Row 12 presents 
estimates which include both occupational matching and proxy control, and as before there is no 
significant difference between these estimates and those in row 9. Although there are no statistically 
significant differences in these last two adjustments, it is with this specification shown in row 12 that 
all further analysis will be undertaken.  
 
The Effect on Plant Size on Earnings – Existing Evidence 
The seminal paper examining the firm/plant size wage premium is that by Brown and Medoff 
(1989).10 They state that “the size-wage differential is one of the key differentials observed in labour 
markets. It is particularly interesting because, unlike the union wage differential it exists in the 
absence of an obvious agent, one whose goal is its existence”. They find both company size and 
establishment size have independent effects on pay, such that a doubling of plant size leads to a 
                                                          
9 We investigated the issue of proxy responses extensively, but regardless of whether we excluded proxy 
responses entirely or controlled for them the nature and magnitude of the results presented are unaffected. 
More specifically, for the results presented in Table 1 a dummy variable to denote a proxy response (which 
captures any bias in reported earnings) was included and also interacted with the public sector variable (to 
capture under/over-reporting of earnings specifically within the public sector). In all instances, neither control 
was significant for women. For men, only the direct control for a proxy response was significant and it 
indicated that proxy respondents under-report earnings to the order of 1.8-2.0%. There is no evidence of a 
systematic difference between sectors. 
10 Earlier, Dickens and Katz (1987) noted a significant increase in wages as plant size increased when reviewing 
the empirical literature in the area. 
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wage premium of between 1.5 and 3.8%. However, as in many other papers (see Oi and Idson, 1999 
and Troske, 1999 inter alia), while they find a significant relationship between plant size and 
earnings, why bigger is better is not fully explained. 
 
Several possible avenues through which such an effect might operate exist. Neoclassical 
explanations include compensating differentials, which could include inferior working conditions and 
increased alienation of work among other factors (Beynon, 1973).  Efficiency wage theories suggest 
large employers may substitute higher monitoring costs with a wage mark-up (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 
1984). Institutional explanations include large establishments attempting to provide good working 
environments to avoid unionisation which have other costs (Freeman and Medoff, 1984). It has also 
been noted that the relationship may arise from the inability in empirical studies to fully control for 
quality differences between large and small plants (Evans and Leighton, 1989). Drawing upon this 
literature, Brown and Medoff evaluated six possible explanations for this positive empirical 
relationship between employer size and wages: the hiring of higher-quality workers; offering inferior 
working conditions; making more use of high wages to forestall unionisation; having a greater ability 
to pay high wages; facing smaller pools of applicants relative to vacancies; and being less able to 
monitor workers. They found supporting evidence for only the first of these explanations. 
 
Alternatively, one explanation not consistent with the cost minimisation approaches already 
discussed is that large establishments may be able to exploit monopoly rents which employees may 
subsequently capture. Brown and Medoff noted that even if this is the case an explanation is 
required to “explain why they pay more than the market wage and why competition for these choice 
jobs does not lead to a work force that is over qualified but not overpaid”. Even if the monopoly 
power argument is accepted, failure to match private sector wages offered by large private sector 
establishments is likely to lead to recruitment and retention problems. However, when comparing 
wages across public and private sector workers it is crucial that a like-for-like comparison is made. A 
natural fit for this would be to compare pay practices in the public sector with those in large, multi-
site private sector organisations that operate in almost all parts of the country. While the availability 
of such data is limited, the empirical literature that has developed using nationally representative 
data across the entirety of the private sector suggests that estimates of the size of the public/private 
sector wage differential should control for establishment size or exclude employees in small 
establishments. In our empirical investigation, we effectively do both. 
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Public/Private Wage Differential and Plant Size 
To examine the role of establishment size on the public/private sector wage differential in more 
detail, Table 2 provides estimates of the differential for different size establishments. These 
classifications are less than 25 employees; between 25 and 249 employees; between 250 and 499 
employees; and establishments with more than 500 employees. For comparability with the 
estimates already discussed from Table 1 wage premiums are presented separately for men and 
women and for two time periods.  A common pattern revealed in the data is that the public sector 
wage premium decreases with established size.  For example, over the period 2011q2 to 2015q4 the 
wage premium for men working in public sector establishments with less than 25 employees is 5.4% 
and for women 8.5%.  Significantly lower premiums are evident in establishments with 25 or more 
employees and for men these premiums consistently favour private sector workers. Indeed, in the 
largest establishments (with 500 or more employees) the wage premium favours both men (-13.3%) 
and women (-9.7%) in the private sector. 
 
[insert Table 2 here] 
 
There are, however, marked market differences in the distribution of public and private sector 
employees across establishment sizes for both men and women (see Table 3).  In the private sector 
in the UK at the aggregate level (see panel (a)), there is a clustering in establishments with 249 or 
fewer employees and as such just less than three quarters of men and over three quarters of women 
are found in such establishments. In contrast, 49.8% of men and 39.0% of women in the public 
sector are in establishments employing 250 or more employees. Moreover, it is in the very largest 
establishments employing over 500 workers that the difference in concentration between public and 
private sectors is most marked. Such sized establishments employ 37.6% of the male public sector 
workforce but only 15.6% of the male private sector workforce. For women, the comparable figures 
are 31.7% and 11.5% respectively.   
 
[insert Table 3 here] 
 
Analysis of differences in establishment size across regions reveals little variations outside of London 
and the remaining panels of Table 3 give three illustrative regions of London (b), the South East (c) 
and Wales (d).11 For men, London has a substantially larger proportion of 500+ establishments in 
                                                          
11 In addition to having been identified by the IFS as a region with a particularly high pay premium, Wales also 
has the highest level of public sector employment for both men and women in the sample. London and the 
South East have the lowest. 
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both the public and private sector than in the country as a whole, being 10 percentage points higher 
in the public sector and 7 percentage points higher in the private sector, and smaller proportions 
working in establishments with less than 25 employees. Across other regions these differences are 
much smaller, with Wales and the South East looking similar in terms of the proportions working in 
different establishment sizes when comparing across sectors. Clearly London, with a large number of 
private sector head offices and the seat of Government and a large civil service workforce, looks very 
different to the rest of the country in terms of the distribution of establishment sizes. 
 
Therefore, not only does the sectoral wage premium vary markedly by establishment size but so too 
does the sectoral distribution of workers. The only concerted evidence of substantial wage 
premiums for public sector workers is when making comparisons with small private sector 
establishment employing less than 25 employees, but only a small proportion of public workers 
(11.8% for men, 16.7% for women) are found in such establishments. For larger establishments 
where public sector workers are more heavily represented, the wage premium is much reduced for 
women and significantly negative for men. From an empirical standpoint, therefore, ignoring the 
influence of plant size can have profound effects upon the size of the public sector wage premium. 
 
Regional Variation in the Public Sector Wage Differential 
As outlined earlier, the Treasury and IFS note significant variations in the public sector pay 
differential across regions even after controlling for a number of characteristics.  For example, in 
Wales the IFS found a public sector pay differential in favour of males of 18.0% and for females 
18.5%. Given the moderation in estimates apparent from Table 1 that arise from adopting our 
preferred specification, it is not surprising that the estimates presented in Table 4 do not approach 
such levels. For the same time period used by the IFS (2009q2-2011q1), there are no significantly 
positive differentials for men, and the only estimates which are statistically significant are for 
London (-14.2%) and the South East (-8.4%), both of which are negative. While Wales does report 
the largest positive premium at 6.6%, this estimate is not significant at any conventional level of 
acceptance. In the case of women over the same period the picture is dramatically different, with 10 
of the twelve regions showing a significantly positive differential, the largest being in Scotland at 
12.0%. Only London has a negative differential (at – 5.1%), while the differential for the South East is 
insignificant. Over the more recent period 2011q2-2015q4, the estimated premiums tend to move 
against the public sector (as previously identified in the aggregate UK context).  For men, the East 
Midlands (-5.0%), South West (-4.7%) and the North West (-3.4%) join London (-11.3%) and the 
South East (-9.8%) in having negative wage differentials.  For women, the South East (-4.0%) now has 
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a negative wage differential, while the pay premiums in East Anglia and the South West are no 
longer significantly positive.12 
 
[insert Table 4 here] 
 
 A corollary of these regional results is that while differentials favour women in the private sector 
across most regions, insignificant sectoral premiums are the norm for male workers. Even though 
differentials have moved away from the public sector after the financial crisis and recovery in the 
private sector that has followed, London and the South East consistently emerge as regions where 
public sector workers are disadvantaged relative to their private sector counterparts. This is 
particularly evident for men, and suggests a policy area that needs addressing. We shall return to 
this in the concluding section.  
 
Plant Size Differential by Regions 
Just as there are important differences across plant size at the national level, as discussed in section 
4.3, then so too do these plant size differences cut across regions. This can be seen in Table 5, which 
provides the same plant size analysis as discussed in Table 2 separately by region for the period 
2011q2-2015q4.13 Consistent with the aggregate results, point estimates decline as plant size 
increases. Particularly striking is the scale of the premium afforded to men working in small plants 
(<25 employees) in Wales. At 21.3%, this is by far the largest regional premium for either gender in 
any size of establishment. While the comparable figure for women is still substantial at 12.8%, it is 
significantly lower than the male premium. However, unlike the majority of other regions, it is not a 
case that females in Wales are not doing well, but rather that the position of male public sector 
workers in Wales is far better than men elsewhere. Meanwhile, significantly positive wage premiums 
are also observed for men in small establishments in only two other regions – Northern (12.4%) and 
Yorkshire & Humberside (11.3%). For women, all but three of the regional premiums in small 
establishments (in London, South East and South West) are statistically significant and positive. 
 
[insert Table 5 here] 
 
                                                          
12 See Blackaby et al. (2012) for a longer-term analysis of the public/private sector wage differential for each 
region going back to 1994. This paper also uses quantile regression techniques to examine the issue of regional 
wage dispersion between the public and private sectors. 
13 The latter period was chosen to provide more robust estimates from the larger sample. Notwithstanding the 
issue of some imprecise estimates, the pattern of differentials identified in Table 5 does not differ substantially 
from that estimated for the earlier period. 
 
 
13 
Moving to the very largest establishments (500+ employees), negative premiums are the norm for 
men. More specifically, within these establishments the wage differential is negative and significant 
in ten out of the twelve regions but not positive in any. Highlighting a recurring finding, London (‒
21.4 %) and the South East (‒20.9%) have sizeable effects and it is these two regions that also have 
the largest premiums in comparable establishments for women (at –16.8% and –14.0% respectively). 
For plant sizes between the two extremes, the regional distribution of mark-ups is particularly 
muted for men, although London and the South East do again emerge as regions with significantly 
negative pay premiums across all establishment sizes. For women in these intermediate plant sizes, 
the general picture is one of a positive pay premium when significant but only outside of the south 
east corner of England. The Northern region and Scotland in particular consistently offer a significant 
premium to public sector workers. In contrast, London consistently affords an advantage to women 
in the private sector, with the South East and East Anglia also exhibiting significantly negative 
differentials in parts. 
 
Comparing like with like is clearly important and while there may be monopoly elements present 
within large plants in the private sector that it would be undesirable to replicate within the wage- 
setting framework of the public sector, the majority of public sector workers are employed in 
establishments within which they do not receive any sort of wage premium at the regional level. This 
is more pronounced for men than it is for women. The one proviso to this is that the situation in 
London and the South East is clearly out of line with the experience elsewhere within the UK.  Within 
these regions, for both men and women, there is clear evidence that public sector workers are 
disadvantaged relative to their private sector counterparts. 
 
Conclusions 
Given the importance attached to recent IFS estimates of the public/private sector pay differential 
by the Government, we have used these findings as a starting point for an examination of public 
sector wage structures across the UK. We find that the public/private pay differential is larger for 
women than for men, and is sensitive to how the dependent variable (hourly earnings) is measured.  
The aggregate wage differential falls and becomes significantly negative for men when additional 
controls such as job tenure, plant size, occupational controls and managerial responsibilities are 
included. For females over the period 2009q2 to 2011q1, the aggregate differential remains positive 
but is substantially reduced relative to a much simpler earnings specification. In the case of regions, 
when additional controls are included the differential is generally insignificant, but significantly 
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negative for London and the South East for men. Controlling for plant size appears to be particularly 
important.  
 
While results suggest the need to revisit regional public sector wage setting, it should be noted that 
introducing and managing market-facing pay could be very expensive with regards additional 
administrative resources. Defining area boundaries can be difficult and these can change over time, 
and local pay differentials could lead to ‘leapfrogging’ and increased turnover costs with little 
efficiency gains. Indeed, many large private sector organisations operating a multi-plant operation 
across the country generally operate very few pay zones, tending to favour central control over pay 
determination as it enables employers to control costs, avoids duplication and provides simplicity. 
We would conclude, though, that a wholesale movement towards fully regionalised pay is 
unwarranted. Much of the previous discussion underpinning such a policy change was based upon a 
limited knowledge base which estimated the public/private sector wage differential using a 
parsimonious earnings equation in the deepest recession in the post war period. Indeed, prior 
evidence has noted the sensitivity of the differential to the trade cycle and in the UK found a small or 
insignificant public/private sector wage differential for males in earlier years. While Treasury 
evidence stated employees in some areas earn considerably more than their private sector 
counterparts, we find evidence that over the period 2009-2015 male public sector employees 
generally do not earn more than private sector employees (controlling for a number of individual 
and workplace characteristics). While this would bring into question the appropriateness of a 
blanket policy of market-facing pay at the regional level, there is incontrovertible evidence that 
public sector workers in London and the South East are disadvantaged. This has fundamental 
implications for recruitment and retention of public sector staff in these areas, and as such there 
would appear to be a very real need to revisit the London-weighting allowance in many areas of the 
public sector. This proposal would be consistent with the work of Propper and Van Reenen (2010). 
 
Large regional public/private sector wage differentials have the potential to damage regional 
development in both prosperous and less prosperous regions, although the evidence is inconclusive 
on crowding out and with no strong support in the UK. We have found that regional public/private 
sector wage differentials are relatively small outside of London and the South-East. Clearly the issue 
of a high cost area premium for London and the South-East needs to be addressed. Such a policy 
could be implemented with a policy of further civil service relocations from London as outlined by 
Lyons (2004). Any increase in a London allowance has the potential to lead to a wage spiral and 
increasing house prices, nullifying any benefit from an increase in nominal wages. The long-standing 
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issue of planning restrictions in London may also need to be addressed if house price inflation is not 
to offset any nominal wage increase.  The challenge, as outlined by Martin et al. (2016), is to support 
the gains from agglomeration without creating further spatial imbalances.  They also note that the 
political structure of the UK, which is heavily biased towards London, has been compounded by 
governments which have located over half of its research and development establishments in the 
South East. New infrastructure spending is also heavily concentrated in London (22% of the total), 
equivalent to £5305 per head as compared to £414 in the North East. The UK also has one of the 
highest levels of spatial disparities of any country in West Europe and Beatty and Fothergill (2013) 
have shown that recent welfare reforms are likely to add to this. 
 
A debate in Parliament (Hansard Online, 2012) on regional pay noted that regional pay could 
‘institutionalise lower pay in poorer areas’ and would lead to a brain drain from already 
disadvantaged areas and go against the Government policy of attempting to rebalance the economy 
following the financial crisis. As noted by Morgan (1997), the less prosperous regions are already 
disadvantaged by relatively low levels of social capital and institutional capacity which are critical for 
encouraging innovation and economic renewal. However, the position of London needs to be 
addressed. One way in which this might be achieved is for public sector organizations to make 
greater use of the flexibility currently available to them like Recruitment and Retention Premiums 
(RRPs) in the NHS. 
 
Finally, it may not always be appropriate for the public sector to mimic the private sector. Evidence 
in this paper finds a larger public/private sector wage differential for women. Does this suggest 
these women are overpaid and should have their wages reduced? Alternatively, it could be that 
more discriminatory practices exist in the private sector, whereby such organizations have not 
implemented the sort of policies they should that are commonly found in the public sector. Full 
comparability with the private sector would increase the gender pay gap, reduce pensions (and their 
coverage) and increase inequality, generally and across regions. Social norms and political 
considerations play a more equalising role in the public sector which also places constraints on the 
top earnings in the public sector which do not match those that exist in the private sector. 
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Table 1 
Public/Private Wage Differentials across Specifications by Gender 
 
Specification 2009q2-2011q1 2011q2-2015q4 
Men Women Men Women 
1. Controlling for age, age squared, age left full 
time education and interactions (actual) 
0.081 
(7.58) 
0.161 
(18.75) 
0.057 
(8.02) 
0.134 
(23.63) 
2. Controlling for age, age squared, age left full 
time education and interactions (usual) 
0.061 
(6.42) 
0.151 
(20.75) 
0.049 
(7.71) 
0.143 
(29.52) 
3. Controlling for education, age, qualification 
and region (usual) 
0.024 
(2.62) 
0.095 
(13.63) 
0.018 
(3.01) 
0.106 
(22.40) 
4. Adding job tenure 
0.019 
(2.05) 
0.088 
(12.76) 
0.011 
(1.78) 
0.096 
(20.39) 
5. Adding establishment size dummy controls 
-0.029 
(3.19) 
0.060 
(8.43) 
-0.035 
(5.72) 
0.060 
(12.35) 
6. Adding occupational controls 
0.010 
(1.23) 
0.084 
(13.69) 
0.003 
(0.59) 
0.059 
(14.00) 
7.  Adding part time 
0.026 
(2.94) 
0.097 
(14.24) 
0.023 
(3.82) 
0.106 
(22.82) 
8. Adding managerial responsibilities 
0.032 
(3.68) 
0.106 
(15.76) 
0.026 
(4.51) 
0.115 
(25.35) 
9. All variables (full) 
-0.039 
(4.72) 
0.056 
(8.88) 
-0.048 
(8.90) 
0.024 
(5.57) 
10.  Specification 9 + proxy 
-0.034 
(3.65) 
0.054 
(7.99) 
-0.047 
(7.54) 
0.023 
(5.02) 
11. Specification 9 + occupational matching 
-0.051 
(5.97) 
0.053 
(8.34) 
-0.051 
(9.37) 
0.022 
(5.08) 
12. Specification 9 + proxy + occupational 
matching 
-0.045 
(4.68) 
0.051 
(7.48) 
-0.050 
(7.92) 
0.021 
(4.54) 
Sample size – row 9 16,469 17,016 38,716 39,949 
 
Notes: absolute t-statistics in parentheses; all figures are estimated using nationally representative 
person income weights. 
 
  
 
 
Table 2 
Public/Private Wage Differentials by Gender and Plant Size 
 
 2009q2-2011q1 2011q2-2015q4 
Men Women Men Women 
Less than 25 employees 
 
0.044 
(1.54) 
0.102 
(6.81) 
0.054 
(2.79) 
0.088 
(8.55) 
Sample size 4,439 5,087 10,738 12,511 
Between 25 and 249 employees 
 
-0.013 
(0.89) 
0.077 
(7.68) 
-0.027 
(2.83) 
0.019 
(2.82) 
Sample size 5,881 6,388 14,302 15,532 
Between 250 and 499 employees 
 
-0.072 
(2.71) 
0.038 
(1.80) 
-0.071 
(4.22) 
0.005 
(0.22) 
Sample size 1,684 1,420 4,209 3,398 
500+ employees 
 
-0.154 
(9.15) 
-0.084 
(5.66) 
-0.157 
(14.92) 
-0.078 
(8.05) 
Sample size 3,009 3,219 7,788 7,914 
 
Notes: absolute t-statistics in parentheses; all figures are estimated using nationally representative 
person income weights. 
 
 
  
 
 
Table 3 
Plant Size Distribution by Sector of Employment and Gender: 2009Q2-2015Q4 
 
 Men Women 
Public Private Public Private 
(a) UK 
<25 employees 11.8 34.2 16.7 42.8 
25-249 employees 38.4 39.0 43.4 36.4 
250-499 employees 12.2 11.2 8.3 9.3 
500+ employees 37.6 15.6 31.7 11.5 
(b) London 
<25 employees 6.8 28.1 9.4 33.4 
25-249 employees 33.1 35.6 43.2 35.3 
250-499 employees 12.4 12.0 9.0 10.5 
500+ employees 47.7 24.4 38.5 20.8 
(c) South East 
<25 employees 10.4 36.4 16.0 43.2 
25-249 employees 41.8 38.4 48.3 36.8 
250-499 employees 12.8 10.8 8.7 9.2 
500+ employees 34.9 14.5 27.0 10.8 
(d) Wales 
<25 employees 14.4 35.4 20.7 46.1 
25-249 employees 39.2 39.2 39.2 34.4 
250-499 employees 11.1 11.1 6.6 10.6 
500+ employees 35.2 14.3 33.6 9.0 
 
Note: figures based upon occupation matching between sectors. 
 
  
 
 
Table 4 
Public/Private Sector Wage Differential by Region and Gender 
 
 Males 
      2009Q2-2011Q1      2011Q2-2015Q4 
Females 
      2009Q2-2011Q1      2011Q2-2015Q4 
Region Coef Sample 
size 
Coef Sample 
size 
Coef Sample 
size 
Coef Sample 
size 
Northern -0.036 
(0.89) 
773 
0.002 
(0.07) 
1,910 
0.102 
(3.58) 
874 
0.093 
(5.43) 
2,178 
Yorkshire & 
Humberside 
-0.009 
(0.29) 
1,363 
0.004 
(0.22) 
3,327 
0.079 
(3.76) 
1,521 
0.077 
(5.38) 
3,777 
East 
Midlands 
-0.012 
(0.35) 
1,152 
-0.050 
(2.17) 
2,786 
0.099 
(4.18) 
1,251 
0.046 
(2.69) 
2,920 
East Anglia -0.033 
(0.70) 
701 
-0.019 
(0.63) 
1,722 
0.086 
(2.58) 
740 
0.036 
(1.56) 
1,828 
London -0.142 
(4.67) 
1,814 
-0.113 
(5.84) 
4,707 
-0.051 
(2.01) 
1,619 
-0.090 
(5.72) 
4,286 
South East -0.084 
(3.36) 
2,793 
-0.098 
(6.29) 
6,895 
0.002 
(0.14) 
3,032 
-0.040 
(3.46) 
7,309 
South West -0.043 
(1.39) 
1,371 
-0.047 
(2.22) 
3,281 
0.067 
(2.86) 
1,493 
0.021 
(1.38) 
3,537 
West 
Midlands 
0.034 
(1.10) 
1,279 
-0.023 
(0.96) 
2,959 
0.070 
(3.07) 
1,360 
0.065 
(4.12) 
3,054 
North West -0.046 
(1.62) 
1,579 
-0.034 
(1.72) 
3,746 
0.077 
(4.07) 
1,708 
0.032 
(2.29) 
4,072 
Wales 0.066 
(1.55) 
589 
0.030 
(1.18) 
1,661 
0.080 
(2.78) 
702 
0.088 
(4.52) 
1,872 
Scotland -0.020 
(0.66) 
1,347 
-0.031 
(1.62) 
3,204 
0.120 
(5.78) 
1,493 
0.096 
(6.87) 
3,544 
Northern 
Ireland 
0.033 
(0.48) 
252 
-0.060 
(1.55) 
839 
0.085 
(2.21) 
321 
0.122 
(4.44) 
978 
 
Notes: absolute t-statistics in parentheses; all figures are estimated using nationally representative 
person income weights. 
 
 
Table 5 
Public/Private Sector Wage Differential by Region and Plant Size: 2011Q2-2015q4 
 
 Men Women 
<25 
employees 
25-249 
employees 
250-499 
employees 
500+ 
employees 
<25 
employees 
25-249 
employees 
250-499 
employees 
500+ 
employees 
Northern 0.124 
(1.86) 
0.011 
(0.28) 
-0.03 
(0.40) 
-0.057 
(1.30) 
0.151 
(4.11) 
0.088 
(3.40) 
0.126 
(2.26) 
-0.028 
(0.66) 
Yorkshire & Humberside 0.113 
(1.78) 
0.027 
(0.87) 
0.032 
(0.56) 
-0.120 
(3.44) 
0.109 
(3.56) 
0.056 
(2.61) 
0.016 
(0.33) 
0.014 
(0.45) 
East Midlands 0.077 
(1.00) 
-0.028 
(0.83) 
-0.080 
(1.08) 
-0.138 
(3.69) 
0.073 
(1.99) 
0.069 
(2.64) 
0.039 
(0.65) 
-0.070 
(1.80) 
East Anglia -0.029 
(0.27) 
0.004 
(0.09) 
-0.056 
(0.82) 
-0.053 
(1.00) 
0.176 
(3.14) 
0.007 
(0.22) 
-0.204 
(2.51) 
0.006 
(0.12) 
London 0.082 
(0.99) 
-0.076 
(2.55) 
-0.105 
(2.11) 
-0.214 
(7.64) 
0.040 
(0.85) 
-0.062 
(2.66) 
-0.103 
(2.09) 
-0.168 
(6.09) 
South East 0.003 
(0.06) 
-0.081 
(3.67) 
-0.123 
(2.96) 
-0.209 
(8.32) 
0.021 
(0.78) 
-0.051 
(3.12) 
-0.048 
(1.31) 
-0.140 
(5.87) 
South West 0.014 
(0.23) 
-0.034 
(1.07) 
-0.131 
(2.13) 
-0.118 
(3.39) 
0.048 
(1.41) 
0.031 
(1.35) 
-0.005 
(0.10) 
-0.074 
(2.23) 
West Midlands 0.036 
(0.43) 
0.029 
(0.88) 
0.036 
(0.54) 
-0.136 
(3.38) 
0.070 
(2.07) 
0.068 
(2.90) 
0.063 
(1.17) 
-0.028 
(0.75) 
North West -0.013 
(0.20) 
0.007 
(0.22) 
-0.098 
(1.99) 
-0.145 
(4.40) 
0.145 
(4.65) 
0.004 
(0.20) 
0.018 
(0.48) 
-0.062 
(2.14) 
Wales 0.213 
(3.07) 
0.039 
(0.99) 
-0.050 
(0.66) 
-0.092 
(1.85) 
0.128 
(3.22) 
0.065 
(2.16) 
-0.078 
(1.06) 
0.092 
(2.20) 
Scotland 0.018 
(0.38) 
0.016 
(0.57) 
-0.025 
(0.43) 
-0.176 
(4.75) 
0.134 
(4.88) 
0.117 
(5.54) 
0.120 
(2.05) 
-0.031 
(0.98) 
Northern Ireland -0.031 
(0.36) 
-0.027 
(0.49) 
-0.021 
(0.18) 
-0.398 
(2.67) 
0.189 
(4.35) 
0.049 
(0.97) 
0.187 
(1.63) 
0.102 
(1.26) 
 
Notes: absolute t-statistics in parentheses; all estimates are calculated using nationally representative person-income weights. 
 
